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Editorial
Lessons learned from recent NATO peace support operations showhow important and multifaceted are these multinational and multi-institutional endeavors. The famous 4 C’s in these situations are the
key operational factors: coherence, compatibility, coordination and
cooperation. The question is how well all the different actors work
together on the ground, whether from governmental or multilateral
agencies or from the non-governmental community, especially during
lengthy and demanding post-conflict reconstruction activities.
These sensitive questions were addressed in depth during two seminars
organized recently by researchers of the NATO Defense College with
different partners. The objectives were to define more precisely
operational and conceptual aspects of NATO/EU cooperation firstly and
NATO/Russia perspectives for joint action secondly. As a matter of fact,
the EU and Russia are for the Atlantic Alliance the two main actors and
partners that engaged with NATO forces in the stabilisation process in the
Balkans. Starting from this common experience, the Academic Research
Branch conducted debates on cooperation issues with various experts
from diverse perspectives.
On NATO/EU cooperation the question was primarily to study post-conflict
operations and to explore reconstruction goals and achievements.
Referring to experiences from the Balkans and Afghanistan, including the
critical topic of narcotics, experts discussed the sensitive questions of how
to plan and organize for reconstruction and make progress toward a
desirable end state. This was the basis for insights on NATO/EU
cooperation, including the current limits and the possible future based on
bottom-up achievements.
On NATO/Russia, the question was much more to rethink how to
combine the different experiences from Russian and NATO forces in
order to define a common foundation and to be able to work together in
joint peace support operations. The conceptual, technical, operational,
and political aspects of these joint actions were explored and addressed
with Russian colleagues. 
Summaries of the key findings from these debates are offered below in
this Research paper.
Jean DUFOURCQ, Chief Academic Research Branch
NB: The views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author and should
not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Les opinions exprimées dans cette publication sont celles de l’auteur et ne peuvent être
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NATO-EU Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction
David YOST1
O n 3-4 November 2005 the NATO Defense Collegehosted a seminar, co-sponsored by the Ministry ofDefense of Finland, regarding NATO and European
Union post-conflict reconstruction operations. The participants
included officials from NATO and the EU, as well as experts and
officials from NATO, EU, and Partnership for Peace nations.
The seminar objectives included:
– promoting more effective EU-NATO cooperation in such
operations,
– evaluating the main problems and achievements of such
operations to date, and 
– assessing lessons from operations in Afghanistan in
particular.
1. Reconstruction goals and achievements
The goals in reconstruction and stabilization operations include
security, economic recovery, social well-being, justice and
reconciliation, and public participation in governance. These
goals are interdependent – for example, establishing the rule of
law promotes economic recovery.  The first imperative remains
security vis à vis internal and external threats.  After the
achievement of a minimal level of security, other goals may be
pursued, from humanitarian relief to self-sustaining governance
under the rule of law.  As one participant observed, “Security
sector reform is the key element of the exit strategy.”
Participants acknowledged that reconstruction operations over
the past decade have genuine achievements to their credit.
Much has been accomplished in terms of physical infrastructure
reconstruction in the Balkans, and the December 2001 Bonn
agenda for Afghanistan has been successfully completed, and
for the most part on time.
The definition of the “end-state” of reconstruction operations is
elusive.  One participant maintained that a multi-year plan, such
as the Bonn agenda for Afghanistan, is a more practical method
of formulating guidelines for action than trying to define an
ultimate end-state.  Indeed, social, economic, and political
changes requiring a generation or more may be necessary to
establish solid foundations for peace between former
belligerents.
Some participants suggested that NATO and the EU should not
undertake a military intervention without giving more thought to
how to achieve desired end-states and to how combat
operations (for instance, the targets destroyed, such as
bridges) may affect subsequent reconstruction operations.
One participant referred to an “effectiveness-legitimacy
dilemma” for military commanders:  that is, enough force must
be used to ensure security and order, but excessive force could
undermine the legitimacy and authority of the protecting power.
2. Planning and organizing for reconstruction
Bureaucratic resistance, including within military services, to
what one speaker called “the bottomless pit of problems” in
stabilization and reconstruction operations has deterred some
national agencies from accepting responsibility for such
operations even in some of the largest NATO and EU countries.
This has led nations to define interagency mechanisms and to
consider establishing agencies dedicated to the function.  The
United Kingdom’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, which
consists of about 30 people, was recently created by the
Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
and the Department for International Development.
3. NATO-EU cooperation
According to one participant, at meetings of the North Atlantic
Council and the European Union’s Political and Security
Committee the only agreed agenda item involving
reconstruction to date has been Bosnia, and even these
discussions have been less than fully satisfactory.  There has
been no formal NATO-EU discussion about operations in Darfur
at the NAC-PSC level.  The EU and NATO are providing support
to the African Union, one participant noted, “independently, but
in parallel and in close consultation.”  In both organizations, a
participant observed, “capitals are very much in the driver’s
seat,” and some nations have created “a deadlock” inhibiting
improved high-level NATO-EU cooperation.  The most positive
NATO-EU interface has remained at the “bottom-up” grass-
roots working level, where staff of the two organizations have on
some occasions created faits accomplis (for instance, cease-
fire agreements in southern Serbia) that their superiors have
accepted.  
Some participants noted that the “Berlin Plus” arrangements,
as adopted in March 2003, provide for assured EU access to
NATO operational planning capabilities and for the availability
of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as
headquarters and communications units, for EU-led operations.
The clearest example is Operation Althea in Bosnia, an EU-led
operation run by SHAPE and DSACEUR.  In view of this
precedent, one participant asked, would it be possible to
envisage a “Berlin Plus-Plus” arrangement, whereby the EU
would provide support to NATO with the EU’s economic and
civilian assets?  The reply from other participants was that such
an arrangement is unlikely in formal terms, but that there have
been some positive signs.  In October 2005 the European
Commission informally asked NATO for advice as to which
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan could
benefit from EU funding.  Flexible solutions may be the way
forward.  EU police training could, for example, be run from a
NATO-led PRT.
4. Continuing challenges in Afghanistan
Several participants underscored the gravity of the challenges
facing Afghanistan after 25 years of war.  As one participant
noted, the country is fifth from the bottom on the Human
Development Index, with an annual income of $200 per person.
Afghanistan’s economy still requires transportation and
communication infrastructure. The country has no railroads,
and its airports and roads are inadequate.
1 Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, currently on secondment to the NATO Defense College as a Senior Research
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One participant described the division of labor in Afghanistan
approximately as follows: security sector reform (NATO),
governance (NATO and the EU), development and
reconstruction (EU), stability and security (NATO), and the
economy (EU).  NATO-EU coordination in Afghanistan has
derived mainly from NATO leadership.  NATO has chaired
monthly meetings of NATO officials with EU and Japanese
representatives.  In contrast, EU officials have met only with
fellow EU officials, except for sometimes inviting Canadian and
Norwegian representatives to their meetings.
According to one participant, 63 per cent of the world’s heroin
and opium originates in Afghanistan. The obstacles to
suppressing the narcotics business include “pervasive”
corruption and inadequate forces to combat the drug traffickers
and illegal armed groups.  Combating the narcotics industry will
require strengthening the special counter-narcotics police force
in Afghanistan. 
The geographical expansion of the area of responsibility of
NATO-led PRTs may soon lead the International Security
Assistance Force and at least some PRTs to face combat.
Among other issues, this will raise the question of how to deal
with detained captives.
5. NATO’s problems in reconstruction operations
NATO’s efforts in support of reconstruction have consisted
above all of operations to restore security. NATO is not a
reconstruction agency, and there is no NATO equivalent to the
EU’s European Agency for Reconstruction.  Once a secure
environment for reconstruction activities has been established,
NATO’s role can be expected to diminish.
The definition of NATO policy depends on consensus, but there
has been a persistent dispute among the allies about the
legitimacy of NATO involvement in stabilization and
reconstruction operations.  Some hold that such operations are
a task for the EU.  Staff work on a NATO policy statement on
reconstruction has nonetheless continued, and NATO’s efforts
in support of reconstruction operations in the field have been
successful.  As with challenges such as organized crime and
trafficking in human beings, forces in the field have at times had
to make decisions in the absence of an agreed NATO policy. 
Another significant problem facing NATO authorities resides in
the caveats on the types of activities that the forces of specific
nations will undertake.  As one participant put it, some Allies are
“cherry-picking” the “soft end” tasks in order to minimize the
exposure of their troops to danger.  This approach is not helpful
to Alliance cohesion and solidarity.
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Prospects for NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support Operations
Lionel PONSARD1
1 Deputy Chief Academic Research Branch, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy.
O n 10-11 October 2005, the NATO Defense College andthe Moscow Center for Political and InternationalStudies (CPIS) co-organized in Moscow a Workshop
on “Prospects for NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support
Operations”. The primary objectives of this seminar aimed at
addressing challenges facing both NATO and Russia in
conducting joint peace support operations; brainstorming the
nature and/or character of future possible NATO-Russia joint
peace support operations; and exploring what instruments
could be used to increase the interoperability for joint peace
support operations of NATO and Russian forces. 
The key findings of this Workshop read as follows:
– Crisis management cannot be the responsibility of just one
international body. We should improve common work and
coordination among different organizations and institutions
with different expertise and comparative advantages. Two or
more institutions should work together, thereby bringing a
greater combination of pressures and incentives for the
resolution of crises. Further development of their interaction
would improve the overall mechanism of a peace support
operation where organizations are assigned certain roles. In
this context, we should also try to provide constructive
answers to the questions of legitimacy and impartiality,
taking into account the fact that the possible absence of a
UN mandate for NATO operations has the potential to
damage NATO’s relations with Russia. 
– Areas for cooperation should be carefully identified. Although
we might consider a broader geographic zone for NATO-
Russia joint peace support operations, a general opposition
from the Russian side is to be expected for any NATO role in
the resolution of crises in the CIS region. 
– It is essential to consolidate and to optimize the available
mechanisms such as the “Generic Concept for Joint NATO-
Russia Peacekeeping Operations”, which represents an
excellent basis for further cooperation. Nevertheless, we
should consider the possibility to elaborate a common
NATO-Russia integrated doctrine for joint peace support
operations. The Berlin Plus Arrangements between NATO
and the EU could even serve as a useful technical example.
This integrated doctrine would offer a common NATO-Russia
assessment of risks and challenges and pave the way for a
common reflection on important issues such as the operating
environment. The current multi-dimensional operating
environment requires indeed a flexible response approach.
In this respect, cooperation should be implemented on the
basis of shared responsibility and coordination mechanisms
should be carefully designed. Mutual trust will only
consolidate if NATO can prove to Russia that it can go
beyond political statements, but also if Russia can prove to
NATO that it is a reliable partner. In the same vein, we should
not only envisage operations that are merely in the interest of
one of the two parties. 
– Mutual understanding is often hampered by the language
problem. This problem, technical from the one side, strongly
NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
1st December 2005
Transforming NATO 2006: The Political Agenda, Seminar organized by
the NATO Defense College, Rome.
David YOST
Panel Chair, NATO-EU Seminar on “Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, NDC, 3-
4 November 2005, Rome, Italy
Lecture on “NATO: History, Structure and Relationship to the United Nations”
for the Modular Short Course on Global Security Challenges, NDC, 7
November 2005, Rome, Italy.
Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP
Lecture on “Religion and State”, Bar Ilan University, 4-5 December 2005, Tel
Aviv, Israel.
Lecture on “La transformation des conflits: les guerres asymétriques”,
université de Paris Sud, Mastère de Diplomatie, 12 December 2005, Paris,
France.
Lecture on “ Réflexions sur la médiation internationale ”, université de Paris
Sud, Mastère de Diplomatie, 12 December 2005, Paris, France.
Jean DUFOURCQ
Lecture on “Le courage d’être chef: pensée et action”, 10ème académie des
entrepreneurs, 19 November 2005, Rome, Italy.
Carlo MASALA
Participation in a Seminar on Transformation, Naval Post-graduate School,
3-18 December 2005, Monterey, United States.
David YOST
Lecture on “La politique de l’OTAN en Méditerranée”, Research Talks with
Morocco, Ministère marocain des Affaires étrangères, 15 November 2005,
Rabat, Morocco.
Attendance to the Conference on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation: What Next
After the NPT Review?”, Wilton Park, 12-16 December 2005, UK.
External Publications
Jean DUFOURCQ
“Vademecum stratégique”, Revue Défense, No. 117, Sept/Oct 2005.
“L’altérité comme facteur stratégique”, Défense Nationale, décembre 2005.
Lionel PONSARD and David YOST, “Is it Time to Update NATO’s Strategic
Concept?”, NATO Review, Autumn 2005, 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/debate.html >
RESEARCH PAPER No. 24
The Role of the Wider Black Sea Area in a Future European Security Space,
by Cees COOPS
Peace in the Middle East after Israeli Disengagement, by Laure
BORGOMANO
OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 8
When Suicide Bombing Reaches the Tipping Point, by Samuel GRIER
OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9
Security Strategies and their Implications for NATO’s Strategic Concept
OCCASIONAL PAPERS No. 10 and 11





Research Paper No. 25 - December 2005
constrains cooperation between Russia’s and NATO’s
representatives. In this respect, the NATO-Russia Glossary
of Contemporary Political and Military Terms can be
considered as an encouraging example. This kind of
endeavors also allows the partners to identify their
differences of understanding more easily. 
– There is a need to raise the public awareness of NATO in
Russia, change the Alliance’s image in the Russian mind,
and ensure that these efforts are made in cooperation with
the Russian leadership. This would put us in a position to
explain to the Russian public opinion why NATO-Russia
cooperation is mandatory in the field of peace support
operations, especially since this area runs high in the whole
spectrum of NATO-Russia activities. Lectures, conferences,
seminars and discussions sponsored jointly by NATO
representatives and Russian public / political organizations
prove to be highly effective. A huge amount of work has
already been done, but also by the different NATO bodies in
Moscow, and by NATO’s educational institutions such as the
NATO School and the NATO Defense College. Those
initiatives should be pursued and intensified.
Specific Comments
– Several participants underscored recurrent Russian complains
about the absence of recognition for their actual capabilities in
peace-support operations and the lack of balanced
cooperation. Common concerns suffer from paradoxes,
contradictions, and protests. Major remarks included a)
Russian operations on the territory of the Newly Independent
States (NIS) with a CIS mandate should not be systematically
questioned in the West; b) little acceptation among Russian
public opinion for NATO-Russia joint operations, particularly on
the territory of the NIS – joint operations are perceived as more
acceptable in the case of a UN mandate, with the EU as a
strategic partner, or in a G8 framework;
– Some experts also noted the Russian insistence on the role
to be granted to the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and more globally on CIS structures. In their view,
the Russian side would like to see NATO recognizing the
CSTO as an effective security provider and as an
appropriate framework for conducting peace support
operations in coalition format;
– In very practical terms, some participants mentioned the
Russian suggestion to develop a “common early warning
structure” with the objective to establish a shared
responsibility and to pave the way for a future strategic
planning process.
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